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Headers are a critical part of HTTP, and it has been shown that they
are increasingly subject to middlebox manipulation. Although this
is well known, little is understood about the general regional and
network trends that underpin these manipulations. In this paper,
we collect data on thousands of networks to understand how they
intercept HTTP headers in-the-wild. Our analysis reveals that 25%
of measured ASes modify HTTP headers. Beyond this, we witness
distinct trends among different regions and AS types; e.g., we ob-
serve high numbers of cache headers in poorly connected regions.
Finally, we perform an in-depth analysis of the types of manipula-
tions and how they differ across regions.
1. INTRODUCTION
HTTP underpins one of the most successful inventions in recent
history: the World Wide Web. Although HTTP has received much
attention, an aspect that remains understudied is that of headers.
These are attribute-value pairs that are embedded within all HTTP
messages. While they are well documented within standards, lit-
tle is known of their practical usage at scale. This is exacerbated
by the increasing propensity for middleboxes to manipulate head-
ers (e.g., for caching, monitoring, censorship). While it is known
that users’ private information can be exposed and tracked through
middleboxes [5], we posit that such middlebox injections may also
reveal a wealth of information about the networks engaged in the
header manipulation. We therefore ask which insights can be ex-
tracted from header manipulations performed across regions and
networks?
To gain an understanding of the use of HTTP headers, we be-
gin by collecting data on almost 1 million websites (§2). We then
present a novel methodology to collect large-scale data on global
HTTP middlebox header manipulation. This involves creating a
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measurement platform using the Hola peer-to-peer proxy network [2]
(§3). Using this platform, we craft and forward HTTP requests via
third party networks to a web server we control. By monitoring
both the request and response endpoints, we can discover manipu-
lations performed by these networks. Exploiting Hola, we launch
over 400k HTTP queries from 143k vantage points in 3818 Au-
tonomous Systems (ASes) — one of the largest studies of its kind.
Unlike techniques using controlled infrastructures (e.g., Planetlab),
this provides unique visibility on a range of network types in coun-
tries rarely studied, e.g., over 400 ASes in Africa (§4).
In this paper we explore the propensity of different network types
and regions to manipulate HTTP headers, in terms of both fre-
quency (§5), and content (§6). We find that header manipulation
is remarkably widespread: hosts in 25% of measured ASes witness
header modifications at least once. Despite this headline figure, our
data shows that the density of middlebox injections varies dramat-
ically across regions, with networks in technologically advanced
countries abandoning the use of caches.
A common theme in our findings is the lack of standards ad-
herence; we find thousands of new non-standard headers returned
by web servers (§2), alongside networks injecting over 40 non-
standard headers (§6). Although this form of extensibility could
be considered desirable, our findings suggest that it runs the risk
of bloating the protocol in a way that breaks down common un-
derstanding. For example, amongst other things, we observe mid-
dleboxes injecting cookies, disabling performance-enhancing fea-
tures, caching against our dictates and adding private information
into requests.
Opinion on whether or not this is damaging is divided, however,
we believe that the Web community is at a juncture at which they
should decide if they wish to support (e.g., via mcTLS [20]) or un-
dermine this behaviour. This is particularly important considering
recent efforts towards new web protocol standards [8, 13]. As such,
this paper provides a unique insight into in-the-wild practices, and
how future protocol decisions on header manipulation may affect
operators in different regions.
2. A PRIMER ON HTTP HEADERS
Before studying middlebox header interference, it is important
to understand (i) what HTTP headers are, and (ii) how they are cur-
rently used by web servers. HTTP was developed in 1991 with the













































Figure 1: Most popular response headers returned from Alexa 1
Million websites. Y axis is number of websites.
an extremely simple protocol consisting of just single line requests.
As webpages increased in sophistication, it became desirable for
further information to be exchanged between clients and servers.
To address this need, HTTP 1.0 introduced headers. HTTP headers
are text-based attribute-value pairs set by clients and servers. These
allow the two end points to exchange metadata regarding requests
and responses. For instance, standard headers in HTTP 1.1 allow
servers to inform clients about content encoding, caching times-to-
live, as well as websites that clients should be redirected to. Once
headers are transmitted across a network, though, they become vul-
nerable to manipulation by intermediate parties. This is enabled by
the remaining bulk of non-encrypted HTTP traffic [19].
To briefly get an idea of the headers used by servers and how they
might differ from those injected by middleboxes, we have scraped
the Alexa Top 1 Million websites to collect their response headers.
We filtered any unsuccessful fetches after two separate attempts,
leaving 928,724 websites. The majority run HTTP 1.1, however,
almost 10k websites are still using HTTP 1.0 (despite being dep-
recated over 15 years ago). Websites, on average, have 9.88 head-
ers, with a propensity for higher ranked websites to increase this
(e.g., 14 for Google, 19 for Facebook, 22 for Twitter). Notable out-
liers exist too; for instance, pokoopka.com has 230 (repeated)
Set-Cookie headers, while the website with the largest number
of unique headers is tiempy.com (with 45). This website has
apparently nonsensical headers (it spells out words across multi-
ple headers). There are many examples of these unusual config-
urations. In total, there are 97 websites that have in excess of 50
(non-unique) headers, and 2252 with more than 25. Standard head-
ers1 make up the bulk (84.6%), although there are far more unique
non-standard headers than known headers. Half of the 9899 unique
header attributes seen in HTTP 200 OK responses occur only once
in the dataset, indicating that they are specific to individual web-
site deployments. Figure 1 presents a histogram of the most fre-
quently seen headers. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delin-
eate them, but it can be seen that certain blocks of standard headers
are frequently seen; e.g., Content-Type, Server and Date are re-
turned by over 95% of websites. A long-tail then emerges with
non-standard and vendor-specific headers being used by smaller
numbers of sites, e.g., CF-RAY (used by CloudFlare) and WP-
Super-Cache (used by WordPress). We even witness job adverts
and jokes contained within headers (e.g., X-Hacker). Adherence to
standards is clearly not considered critical. We take this as strong
motivation to look at the other ways in which these standards may
be undermined.
1As dictated by IANA [17].
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATASET
3.1 Overview of Hola
We begin by briefly describing Hola, which we use to launch
our measurements [3]. Hola is a peer-to-peer proxy network that
allows clients to forward their requests through other peers running
the Hola-browser plugin. This allows clients to appear as if their
requests are emanating from different networks (often to avoid geo-
firewalls). Hola consists of a mix of dedicated servers and peers
running a local browser plugin. When a client wishes to proxy a
web fetch through another country, it sends its request via a Hola
server called a zagent. Each zagent runs multiple proxy processes
on different ports, with each port dedicated to forwarding requests
via a given country. Upon receiving a web request, these zagents
forward the request via a peer in the appropriate country.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Data Collection
We use Hola to trigger HTTP requests from third party networks
around the globe towards a web server we control. Hola simply
forwards the requests we send it, allowing us to craft the exact
HTTP request headers we desire. By crafting both the request and
response, we can detect any header modifications taking place in
the networks through which Hola forwards the traffic. We selected
Hola as we wish to gain a wider vantage than that provided by aca-
demic networks (e.g., Planetlab) or data centre networks (e.g., open
proxies [23]). This diversity is later confirmed (cf. §4).
We use a default Apache web server build (7 response head-
ers) with the exception of disabling all caching (using the Cache-
Control header). This configuration reflects well the typical setups
we observe in our Alexa scrapes (§2). We then iterate through all
country codes, requesting that Hola forwards our request through
each country one-by-one. In this round-robin fashion, we launched
405k HTTP GET requests to our server via Hola (using their API).
Our requests contained 6 default headers: Host, User-Agent, Ac-
cept, Keep-Alive, Accept-Encoding and Connection. We record
all messages received at our client and server side, after having been
proxied through Hola.
3.2.2 Data Processing & Cleaning
We next subset our data to leave only successful fetches. We
then separate our dataset into requests (received by our server) and
responses (received by our client). Both have been routed through a
third party network using Hola. We consider a request/response as
being modified if any of the following cases apply: (i) the value of
a header has had one or more character modifications; (ii) a header
attribute has been added; or (iii) removed.
This allows us to see if a request or response is modified. A key
issue, however, is minimising the possibility of Hola peers locally
manipulating our headers (e.g., by anti-virus software). To mitigate
this, we manually identify headers that are known to be injected
by software running on end hosts. This was done using a range of
online resources, e.g., IANA, RFCs, web security services. This re-
vealed 5 locally injected headers in our data. All such headers were
filtered from the data. This cleaning removed 368 instances of local
response header injection, and 3 instances of request header injec-
tion. The overwhelming majority of these instances (98%) were
generated by malware and adware running on the Hola peer: X-
OSSProxy, Gyoarazujo and X-Vitruvian. These operate as local
proxies that intercept and manipulate requests (e.g., to inject ad-
verts). The remaining 2% were less nefarious, e.g., ad blockers and
Do Not Track.
This still leaves the small possibility that some end hosts were
injecting headers traditionally injected by in-network middleboxes
(e.g., by installing Squid locally). To identify this, we separated
all samples into their origin ASes and extracted ASes for which we
have over 5 samples. We then searched for peers that were the only
nodes in the AS to make a given change. The rationale was that
such peers may be injecting headers locally, thereby differentiating
themselves from the remaining samples in the AS. We then manu-
ally inspected these manipulations, discovering the presence of var-
ious headers containing things like localhost or 127.0.0.1. Hence,
we compiled a simple set of rules to filter such fetches from the
dataset (removing 1016 samples). Following this step, out of 405k
fetches, only 88 requests and 92 responses remained that were ex-
clusively manipulated by a single node in an AS. These showed no
explicit indications of local manipulation. We are therefore confi-
dent that any remaining modifications were introduced somewhere
along the intermediate peer→ server path and not by the peer itself.
Our data is available at [26].
3.2.3 Peer Metadata
To get an idea of the networks we have sampled, we augment
each Hola peer with metadata. First, we geolocate every peer IP
address. It is well known that individual geolocation databases con-
tain errors [21]. Hence, we use majority voting from 10 separate
databases.2 These IPs correspond to either the public address of the
peer or, alternatively, an intermediate TCP-terminating middlebox
(generally these are in the same network, but not always). Fur-
ther, we limit our granularity to country-level geolocation, which
reports high accuracy [24]. We then map each peer to their re-
spective AS using the same databases. Finally, we tag each peer
with its AS type. We experimented with three off-the-shelf AS
classifiers: (i) The CAIDA AS Rankings [1]; (ii) A classifier pro-
vided by Dhamdhere et al. [11]; and (iii) A classifier provided by
Dimitropoulos et al. [12]. The first provided high recall, but only
a coarse (3 category) classification, whilst the other two provided
much lower recall but a slightly finer-grained classification. In this
paper we utilise the third classifier, as this offered similar recall to
(ii) but with a finer grained classification.
3.3 Data Limitations and Ethics
It is important to outline key limitations in the dataset. Most ob-
vious is the use of a third party system (Hola), which could intro-
duce unexpected behaviour. To mitigate this risk, we have exten-
sively tested Hola to identify unusual behaviour. Fortunately, the
only anomalies seen (e.g., injecting X-Hola-Error headers) can be
cleaned from the data. Another consideration is that our measure-
ments are not an unbiased sample of networks around the globe.
As a general-purpose tool, the bias induced by more Western “tech-
savvy” crowd sourced measurement platforms may be reduced though.
We also acknowledge that Hola cannot tell us where the manip-
ulations happen. That said, by filtering locally injected headers,
we can be confident that any modifications were performed on the
peer→ server path. Of course, this leaves the possibility that the
middlebox exists in a different network to the client, however, this
still reveals a network that is subjected to manipulations. Hence,
we temper our analysis with this consideration. Finally, it is worth
noting that the use of Hola may raise ethical questions, as we are
forwarding requests through users’ machines. To mitigate these, we
only forward requests to our own web server (containing a “Hello
2OpenIPMap; MaxMind; Whois; RIRs’ allocation files for RIPE,
APNIC, ARIN, AFRINIC and LACNIC; Team Cymru; and Re-
verse DNS lookups, which were used to infer the location based on
city, country codes (CCs) or airports in the reverse names.
World” page). As such, there is no risk of triggering censorship.
Further, Hola informs its users about how it operates. Hence, users
are already aware that they operate as proxy points. We have ob-
tained IRB approval.
4. CHARACTERISING HOLA
We begin by briefly describing Hola’s scale and distribution, as
captured by our measurements. In total, we have collected data
covering 143,288 IP addresses in 3818 ASes. To add context, this
can be compared against other state-of-the-art measurement plat-
forms, e.g., Dasu (2431 ASes [22]), although it should be noted that
each platform supports very different features. Figure 2 presents
the density of (i) Hola users, as measured by IP addresses; and
(ii) unique ASes hosting Hola nodes. It can be seen that Hola pos-
sesses vantage on every region in the world: 216 countries and
territories. Consequently, the beauty of Hola, compared to other
platforms, is that is can provide very wide vantage on these global
users. This is an attractive property, as we see data regarding many
areas that often are excluded from such studies (e.g., Africa). In
terms of IP addresses, the best represented country is the US, whereas,
in terms of ASes, Ukraine is best represented. At first, we thought
this may be a geolocation error, however, we manually confirmed
the veracity. This is perhaps a product of the differing ISP mar-
ket structures seen in these countries. But, to address this imbal-
ance, we primarily characterise manipulations on a per-AS basis
(rather than per-IP), to reduce the bias introduced by highly popu-
lous ASes.
To better understand the nature of Hola’s network sampling, Ta-
ble 1 provides a breakdown of the types of networks seen (based on
the classifier in §3.2.3). It only lists statistics on the ASes that were
successfully classified. Customer indicates a variety of commer-
cial networks that do not offer residential Internet access (e.g., web
hosts), whilst Network Information Centres (NICs) are ASes that
host important infrastructure (e.g., root domain name servers). Full
details of the AS meanings and methodology can be found in [12].
The analysis confirms a wide sample of networks types. We argue
this diversity is highly attractive for studying header manipulations,
as it gives a wide vantage on global behaviour. More generally, this
also confirms Hola’s efficacy as a powerful platform for web data
collection.
5. WHO MANIPULATES HEADERS?
5.1 Measuring Across Networks
First, we inspect how header manipulations occur across the sam-
pled ASes. 21% of the ASes have requests manipulated, compared
to 19% for responses. Overall, 25% contain sessions that manipu-
late headers at least once. We discover that classifying ASes in this
manner, however, is not straightforward. To highlight this, Figure 3
presents the top 100 most sampled ASes that contain modifications
to headers; each AS is separated into requests that were manipu-
lated and requests that were not. Curiously, it can be seen that many
ASes contain both modified and non-modified requests. Evidently,
this is problematic when classifying an entire AS. Inspection sug-
gests that this occurs for a variety of reasons, most likely due to
a diversity of paths and middlebox deployments within a large AS
and its interconnected networks (as well as misconfiguration [25]).
This also raises the question of what types of ASes witness these
changes. To answer this, we separate all ASes into the classifica-
tions presented in §3.2.3. Figure 4 breaks down ASes into their
types, and then presents CDFs of the percentage of samples in each
AS that modify headers. Table 1 further provides statistics on the













Req Res Req Res Req Res Req Res Req Res
Net Info Centre 41 992 585 8059 8466 10.96 6.46 34.15 39.02 7.39 7.50
Customer 348 2432 978 29086 30536 7.72 3.10 15.52 15.80 5.58 4.72
Regional ISP 798 9395 4184 159589 164798 5.56 2.48 32.08 29.82 7.06 4.40
Tier-1 15 47 21 2998 3024 1.54 0.69 26.67 33.33 10.33 7.38
University 62 9 7 1009 1011 0.88 0.69 4.84 3.23 1.97 1.94
Table 1: Statistics per AS types (excluding samples that could not be classified into AS type).
(a) Number of IP addresses per country (max 2803)
(b) Number of ASes per country (max 325)
Figure 2: Map of IP and AS samples from Hola; dark blue repre-
sents highest density.
behaviour of ASes within each group. It can be seen that the dif-
ferent AS types exhibit a range of trends. University ASes stand
out as having very few modifications (3% of ASes for responses,
5% for requests). Overall, networks classified as NICs are the most
likely to manipulate headers (39% of ASes for responses, 34% re-
quests). While it is hard to definitively state the reasons, it is well
known that university networks tend not to transparently intercept
traffic [10]. NICs and hosting centres, on the other hand, may de-
ploy dedicated infrastructure to optimise their activities. It can sim-
ilarly be seen that ISPs tend to have high proportions of manipula-
tions. 32% of regional ISPs inject headers into requests at least
once. Again, this reflects commonly understood business models,
in which these edge networks may wish to reduce their egress traf-
fic by utilising cache middleboxes. Studying middleboxes without
an appreciation of the types of networks sampled therefore could
be quite misleading.
The above indicates that networks might deploy header-manipulating
middleboxes in only a subset of locations. To expand on this, we
can also check if the manipulated samples seen within an AS al-
ways make the same modifications. To explore this, we subset



















ASes (ranked by number of samples)
Modifying
Non-Modifying
Figure 3: Number of requests for the top 100 ASes sampled that
modify headers at least once (manipulated vs. not manipulated
samples per AS) .
then map them into their respective ASes, and filter out any ASes
in which we only have a single IP address. For each AS, i, we
extract the full set of headers that are manipulated, Hi. For each
header, h ∈ Hi, we calculate the percentage of samples in the AS
where h is modified. For example, if all samples in an AS modify
the Server header, we assign that AS a Server value of 100%. By
averaging the percentages within an AS for all manipulated head-
ers, H̄i, a single value can be obtained per-AS. Figure 5 presents
a CDF of the per-AS averages. It can be seen that only 44% of
ASes exclusively record the same modifications for all requests,
whilst this is 32% for responses. This leaves a significant fraction
of samples from an AS that vary the headers that are manipulated.
This confirms that users in individual ASes are subject to a mix of
manipulations, and the heteogeneity of these changes is high.
5.2 Measuring Across Regions
Anecdotally, it is known that different regions have different
styles of network deployment. With our data it is possible to evalu-
ate the prevalence of header-manipulating middleboxes across dif-
ferent regions. We sample all continents: Africa (442 ASes), Asia
(1114), Europe (1581), Middle East (209), North America (394),
Oceania (154) and South/Central America (182).3 Figure 6 presents
the fraction and number of ASes per country (top 30 countries) that
record manipulated headers. Absolute numbers are shown with the
bars (right axis), whilst the fraction of modifying ASes is shown by
the line (left axis). We only include countries where we have suffi-
cient sampling, of at least 10 ASes. Broadly speaking, we see sim-
3Note that some ASes have a presence in multiple continents, and



















Figure 4: CDF of the percentage of requests that are modified on a











% of Identical Header Changes Across Samples in Each AS
Requests
Responses
Figure 5: CDF of percentage of Hola peers in an AS that see the
same headers changed. Each AS is represented by the average
taken across all headers manipulated.
ilar fractions for both request and response manipuation per coun-
try (correlation 0.73), however, there are noteworthy discrepancies,
e.g., in Jordan, only 21% of ASes manipulate responses, compared
to 50% that manipulate the requests. This confirms the need to use
both endpoints to detect interference.
The reasons for these countries exhibiting such trends are likely
diverse. To get an idea of these, we compare them against well
known technological, economic and societal measures. To this end,
we collect metrics from (i) The Web Index: a composite ranking
that measures a country’s online capabilities; and (ii) The World
Bank: an organisation that compiles economic data. Figure 7 presents
the Spearman correlation coefficient for the fraction of ASes that
manipulate headers in a given country vs. the metrics taken from
the Web Index and the World Bank. Due to space constraints, we
do not delineate the nature and methodology behind each metric;
instead, full details can be found at [31, 32]. However, it can be
seen that there is a strong negative correlation between a coun-
try’s header-manipulating middlebox deployment and its positions
in these metric rankings. High middlebox deployments are cor-
related with less developed countries (as measured via the met-
rics presented). This can generally be observed too, e.g., 36% of
African ASes manipulate requests compared to just 8% in Europe.
This is somewhat counterintuitive as one might expect more de-
veloped countries to have larger infrastructure deployments. The
most correlated factors in Figure 7 pertain to how widely avail-
able services are to individuals in a country. It appears that nations
with less developed infrastructures rely more heavily on the use of
middleboxes (most prominently caches). To explain this, we con-







































































































































































Figure 6: The bars show the number of ASes that modify (a) re-
quest, and (b) response headers per country. The green line shows
the fraction of ASes that modify per country.
the veracity of our findings. The main reason listed by European
operators was the progressive reductions in network transit prices,
alongside greater peering via Internet eXchange Points [6]. In con-
junction with higher line rates, this meant that such operators may
actually have to pay more for running multi-Gbps web caches than
simply contacting the origin via peering or transit. This, however,
was not the case for African operators, who still complained of
exorbitant transit costs and a distinct lack of peering [14]. An-
other frequently cited reason by European operators was the de-
ployment of dedicated provider-specific caches in their networks
(e.g., Google Caches, Netflix Appliances). Considering the bulk of
traffic handled by these websites, the need for augmentary trans-
parent caches was radically reduced. But, again, the presence of
these in Africa is still limited [15]. These reasons have meant that
the business case for transparent caching in developed regions has
reduced, whereas it is still strong in developing countries.
6. WHAT MODIFICATIONS ARE MADE?
The previous section has shown how regions and networks dif-
fer in their frequency of header manipulation. Next, we inspect the
content of the changes made. To explore this, we manually classify
all manipulated headers into functional categories using various re-
sources (e.g., RFCs, W3C, IANA, blogs). Table 2 presents the 5





























































Figure 7: Correlation coefficient for fraction of ASes that manipu-
late in a country vs. metrics taken from the Web Index and World
Bank (only countries with 10+ AS samples).
Header Type #Headers inCategory
Total #Headers
injected/modified
Request Response Request Response
Cache 4 9 8419 3799
Operational 12 9 5090 63
Feature 8 3 639 1884
Information 1 5 20 20
Unknown 4 3 10 41
Table 2: Number of headers in each category, and number of in-
stances of headers being injected/modified (count based on unique
IP addresses).
see globally; a full list of the classifications can be found in [26].
Figure 8 separates all IP samples into their continents, and presents
the fraction of manipulations that fall into each category. We em-
phasise that we are not trying to classify middleboxes themselves;
instead, our focus is on the individual headers they manipulate. We
now describe each category, and their regional presence.
6.1 Caching Headers
Caching headers are those that add information relating to cache
operations (e.g., cache hits); these account for a significant frac-
tion of manipulations. In-line with earlier discussion (§5.2), we
find that regions with higher transit prices tend to have a higher
proportion of caching headers [6]. For instance, 93% of IPs (79%
of ASes) sampled in Oceania (OC) witness cache-related response
manipulations (OC has amongst the most expensive transit in the
world [6]); it is also common in other regions with high transit
prices, i.e., Africa (AF), South/Central America (SA) and the Mid-
dle East (ME). In contrast, well-networked regions with reduced
transit prices such as Europe (EU) and North America (NA), show
the fewest cache-related manipulations. Figure 8 also shows that
continents that see high proportions of cache-related response ma-
nipulations, also see similar trends for their requests. The only no-
table exception is SA, which sees a high proportion of cache head-
ers injected into responses (79% of IPs, 77% of ASes), but few in
requests (17% IPs, 18% Ases); the exact reasons for this trend are
unclear.4
Next, to inspect the specific header attributes, Figure 9 presents
the global most frequently modified headers. Many at the top are
cache related. This is largely because of a few specific headers that
are regularly manipulated. 5% of measured ASes edit our preset
4We are not stating that SA does not have caches — only that it is




















































(b) Breakdown of response header types
Figure 8: Fraction of header manipulations in each category.
Counts based on unique IP address samples.
Cache-Control response header. The majority of these changes
(99%) add extra settings (must-revalidate and no-store), whereas
others change the existing ones, e.g., increasing the max-age set-
ting from 0 to 60. We also note that 3 ASes completely remove
the Cache-Control header set by the server. This enables both
browser and in-network caching against our will. Other promi-
nently injected headers include X-Cache (9% of ASes), and X-
Cache-Lookup (6.9% of ASes). These non-standard headers are
used by a variety of cache implementations to report cache hits
(making it trivial to detect caches). We note they may be used for
attacks [16]. Their presence also allows us to check for middle-
boxes that might be caching uncacheable content against the in-
structions of our server. We find one South American AS doing
this. Another cache-related header (injected in 18 ASes) is Age,
which states the age of the object in the cache. 110 samples have
this added, with 96 setting values greater than 0, further revealing
caches that store uncacheable content.
6.2 Operational Headers
Operational headers are those that pertain to infrastructural op-
erations other than caching, e.g., tagging middleboxes, firewalls,
recording IPs. Globally, we only observe 18 Middle Eastern, 6
Asian and 3 African ASes injecting operational response headers,
all of which are non-standard (various bespoke functions, e.g., ven-
dor specific firewalls).
Far more networks inject operational request headers though. In
fact, in SA, the vast majority of request manipulations are opera-
tional. The high frequency is due to two key headers. The most fre-



































Figure 9: Number of ASes that manipulate each header.
is injected by a middlebox to inform the server of its presence. We
observe this within 9.8% of ASes; perhaps more noteworthy is the
remainder that do not implement this standard. This again confirms
the poor adherence to standards exhibited by in-the-wild middle-
boxes.
The second most frequently injected operational header is X-
Forwarded-For, present in samples from 8.4% of ASes (not in-
cluding vendor-specific equivalents like Client-IP and X-Real-IP).
This header identifies the client IP address when being forwarded
through a proxy. That said, in 64.7% of cases, this header stipu-
lates a private address (e.g., 10.0.0.0/8), with a further 11.2% list-
ing “Unknown”, making it redundant for its purpose. We note that
X-Forwarded-For has gained widespread usage, whereas the stan-
dardised version, Forwarded (RFC 7239), was not encountered
a single time. This suggests that converting X headers into stan-
dards is a non-trivial process. We also see a cellular-specific header
worth mentioning: 18 IP addresses (within an AS in Jordan) in-
ject the phone number of the mobile device using a header called
MSISDN.5 This leak was also observed in [29], and certainly un-
derlines the capacity for privacy undermining activity within these
injections. Finally, we also see various bespoke operational head-
ers from web filters/firewalls; e.g., Barracuda’s CUDA_CLIP (7
ASes). We see no particular geographical pattern regarding these
vendors.
6.3 Feature Request/Advert Headers
Feature headers are those that request or advertise a certain be-
haviour from the opposite endpoint. These mostly occur in re-
sponses, with Asia and NA injecting the greatest proportion over-
all. For example, Accept-Encoding and Connection are two pre-
set feature headers that are manipulated (both by 1.5% of ASes).
That said, it is actually more common to remove them: 12% of
ASes completely remove the Connection header, disabling keep-
alive settings. Other middleboxes inject their own feature adverts
to make it seem like the server has advanced functionality. For ex-
ample, we find 6 ASes injecting the Surrogate-Capability header
(this offers support for the Edge Side Language, which allows re-
mote composition of websites on the client). There is one further
feature header worth noting: 718 ASes remove the Keep-Alive
header. RFC 2616 formalised the use of Keep-Alive, classifying it
as a hop-by-hop header that should be removed by proxies. Clearly,
many middleboxes adhere to this standard and, thus, it is an effec-
tive means to detect middleboxes.
5We do not see many cellular headers because Hola is aimed at
desktop devices.
6.4 Information Headers
Information headers contain metadata that describes the client
or server. Information headers are rarely seen in the data, with a
slightly higher propensity to see them in developed regions: NA
and EU. An interesting example is the User-Agent header, which
informs the server of the type of browser requesting the page. We
find 15 ASes manipulating this, and downgrading the browser ver-
sion, e.g., from Firefox 5.0 to 4.0. We even see 378 IP addresses
where the HTTP version is downgraded to 1.0 (from 1.1). In 82%
of the samples, these requests had passed through a Squid proxy.
Worryingly, we often see old middlebox software: 34% of Squid
samples are running version 2.7 or older (last updated 2010). We
even find 22 ASes using Squid software that has not been updated
for at least a decade (v2.5). These are overwhelmingly in countries
that rank lowly in the Web Index; apart from two ASes in Australia
and Belgium, the highest ranked country is 32nd (Czech Republic).
Finally, we observed 28 responses in which a Set-Cookie header
was injected. A Croatian AS was responsible for 8 of these, likely
part of monitoring or customer tracking [5, 4]. There were a fur-
ther 20 samples that had cookies returned due to interceptions by
various other types of middleboxes (e.g., Netscalar, Cisco Access
Control). This actually highlights a particularly worrying feature
of Hola, as it allows users to obtain the cookie identifiers of others.
6.5 Unknown Headers
It is worth briefly noting that we could not conclusively classify a
number of headers: X-Client-TOS (4 ASes), SFID, X-TMV-Type
(2 ASes), X-DG-TaggedAs, X-IMForwards (1 AS) and the enig-
matic - - - - - - - (1 AS). The fact that no public documentation
exists perhaps indicates that notable subsets of HTTP can no longer
be considered “standard”. The region with the greatest proportion
of these is AF, although they also occur in NA and AS.
7. RELATED WORK
Middleboxes have recently become a hot topic. Early work high-
lighted their expanding and diverse roles [25], whilst recent work
has been developing ways to more openly interact with them [20,
33]. Most related to our work is the small set of studies specifically
targeting HTTP middleboxes. We have taken inspiration from the
pioneering work performed by the Netalyzr service [18, 30], which
crowd sourced measurements from volunteers. In 2010, they found
that 8.4% of Netalyzr sessions passed via an HTTP proxy [18],
whilst that increased to 14% in 2014 [30]. Another recent study
quantified HTTP middleboxes in cellular networks [29, 28] show-
ing that 13% (of 299 mobile operators) were manipulating head-
ers [28]. Our work has confirmed a wide presence of middleboxes.
Furthermore, unlike past work, our contributions have gone beyond
detecting middleboxes: we have shed light on the different usages
of middleboxes across types of networks and regions. Through this,
we have explored the specific types of manipulations performed by
these diverse regions, highlighting their relevance. It is also worth
noting that another interesting study recently utilised the Hola in-
frastructure, although the focus was not on header manipulation [9].
8. CONCLUSION
This paper has explored the diverse HTTP header manipulations
performed across regions and networks. Whereas past work has ex-
plored how these header manipulations reveal data about users, we
shed insight on how they can expose network and regional trends.
We find that header manipulation is commonplace: hosts in 25% of
measured ASes witness headers modifications at least once. We
also observe that middlebox injections are substantially different
across regions. For instance, our results show that well connected
regions such as Europe expose fewer caching headers than regions
such as Africa, where transit is costly. While revealing, it should
also be noted that exposing this information is a potential security
threat, due to the frequent use of old and vulnerable middlebox
software [7].
Our future work will focus on exploring how these trends evolve.
Interestingly, many HTTP/2.0 browser implementations are follow-
ing an encrypt everything model, which will undermine some mid-
dlebox functions. This is perhaps concerning as our work indi-
cates a widespread dependence on their functionality. Hence, ISPs
may endeavour to find ways around this [27]. This is particularly
the case for security and performance oriented middleboxes, which
may be considered critical to business operations. Hence, we be-
lieve that the continued monitoring of this process could offer fas-
cinating insight into how network operators react and optimise to
changes in Web protocols.
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